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Abstract
Using a unique French dataset, we analyze the relationship be-
tween remigration intentions and several immigrants’ behaviors in the
host and origin countries addressing the potential endogeneity of rem-
igration intentions. We also investigate the potential trade-off and
complementarities between various immigrants’ investment behaviors.
We find that temporary migrants are more likely to invest in the coun-
try of origin but less likely to invest in the host country. Moreover,
our results suggest a trade-off between immigrants’ investment in the
home and in the host country.
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tion, remittances.
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1 Introduction
Temporary migration is an important facet of migratory movements.1 Faced
with growing opposition to immigration, destination countries in Western
Europe and the US have recently relied on more selective and temporally con-
strained migration schemes. These schemes were designed in the belief that
the hosting society could benefit from the immigrant labor force (younger,
working-age individuals contributing to the welfare state) while reducing the
potential costs associated with immigration (in particular by reducing the
need for cultural assimilation and limiting access to some welfare transfers).
Yet, not enough is known about how temporary migration and in particular
remigration intentions affect immigrants’ behavior.
Remigration intentions might impact whether immigrants invest in the
host country both in terms of specific human capital and physical capital. On
the one hand, immigrants who plan to leave might have little incentive to as-
similate or to invest in host-country-specific human capital such as language
(Dustmann, 1999). They might also be less likely to invest in physical capi-
tal, such as housing, because of the limited asset-return period. On the other
hand, temporary migrants might invest in language skills if the returns to
human capital accumulated abroad are high (Dustmann, 1997). Moreover,
investment in the host country might be the ideal channel to accumulate
savings before a potential leave.
Thus, the implications of temporary migration might not be straightfor-
ward and require empirical evidence. Although remigration intentions do not
always materialize in actual leave or out-migration, this is not a concern for
us since our interest is in how current remigration intentions impact current
behaviour as opposed to future behaviour. As Dustmann and Go¨rlach (2016)
1See Dustmann and Go¨rlach (2016) for a recent survey of the literature.
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point out, observing completed migration spells would not be useful, since
shocks are likely to affect migrants’ remigration plans during the migration
spell.
We study the relationship between migrant’s intention to leave the host
country and several behavioral decisions. We focus on the case of France
where immigration assimilation has been under scrutiny recently. We use a
unique individual level household survey data, called “Trajectoires et orig-
ines”, collected in France in 2008-09. This rich data includes information on
immigrants’ financial, human and social capital investment decisions both
in the host (France) and home country. In this representative sample of
the migrant population in France, a majority of those intending to leave are
planning to return to their country of origin.2
We account for the potential endogeneity of remigration intentions and
observed outcomes using the intention to be buried outside France and the
perception of discrimination in France as exclusion restrictions. In addition,
we investigate the potential trade-off or complementarity between various
immigrants’ investment decisions. Indeed, whether immigrants’ investment
decisions at home and at host move in the same direction or compete with
one another is unknown. For example, previous studies generally find that
temporary migrants are more likely to remit compared to permanent ones.3
At the same time, they are also more likely than permanent migrants to save
for their own future consumption or investment, which could be done at the
expense of investment in their origin country.
This paper aims at contributing to a small literature on the effect of
temporary migration plans on behavior in the host and home country. Our
approach allows an improvement on three fronts. First, unlike previous stud-
ies, we study a number of immigrants’ decisions, rather than one outcome in
2Return migration from Western European countries has been documented to be sub-
stantial. See for example, Bijwaard (2010) on return migration from the Netherlands.
3These monetary transfers might increase the recipients’ consumption or serve to pre-
pare the migrant’s return (see e.g. Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2006). Some experiments
on directed giving have shown that immigrants like to have some control over their mon-
etary transfers (Batista et al. 2015, Torero and Viceisza, 2015). Labeling remittances
as intended for a specific purpose, such as children’ education, might also increase the
propensity to remit of migrants (De Arcangelis et al., 2015). Finally, remittances can also
be perceived as a way of self-insurance for migrants (Batista and Umblijs, 2016). The
information provided in our survey data focuses on financial transactions only and does
not stipulate the motives of the transfer or whether a specific expense is intended by the
migrant.
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isolation, in order to build a more complete picture of immigrants’ behavior.
A second source of improvement comes from our treatment of the po-
tential endogeneity of remigration intentions. Indeed, the desire to leave
France and investment decisions of migrants may be caused by unobserved
characteristics or the causation may actually run in the opposite direction.
We rely on the variation in remigration intentions provided by instrumental
variables that are not likely to be linked to the outcomes in any other way
than through remigration intentions. In particular, we use intention to be
buried abroad for outcomes related to France and opinion about the extent
of discrimination in France for outcomes directed to the origin country.4
Finally, we explicitly take into account the potential trade-offs and/or
complementarity when estimating the investment decisions on a large set of
choices. Most previous studies either focused on a sole outcome or when ex-
amining two outcomes, such as remittances and savings for example, ignored
the correlation between those decisions. We examine the potential trade-offs
and complementarity between not only physical investment decisions, but
also human capital investment decisions and non-monetary decisions. In ad-
dition, we repeat our analysis on the subsample of immigrants from Africa,
the main region of origin of immigrants in France.
We find that migrants who intend to leave are more likely to invest in
their home country and less likely to invest in host-specific assets. We also
uncover that remigration intentions lead to a substitution between invest-
ment at home and at host (at least at the level of the extensive margin):
temporary migrants are more likely to invest at home while simultaneously
being less likely to invest in France. Focusing on African immigrants, we find
that remigration intentions affect their monetary investment decisions signif-
icantly more than for the average immigrant in the full sample. In contrast to
what we find for the full sample, intention to leave does not significantly re-
duce African migrants’ probability to invest in France while it does increase
their probability to invest at origin when both investments are considered
jointly.
This paper has important policy implications. First, if the duration of the
migration spell impacts immigrants’ investment behavior in the host country,
this should be better accounted for in the design of migration policies. For
instance, if host countries want to foster the integration of immigrants, it
4The perceived level of discrimination one lives in has indeed been documented as a
push factor in the emigration decision. See for instance Ruyssen & Salomone (2015).
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is important to provide the right incentives by securing certainty on the
duration of stay. Repeated temporary visas might reduce the expected gains
of this type of investment for the migrant. Secondly, our results raise a
concern about the implications of temporary migration schemes as they are
likely to lead to lower investments by migrants in the host country- an issue
that needs to be redressed in particular as far as language and assimilation
are concerned. Thirdly, however, temporary migrants and those planning to
leave are a potential channel through which human and financial resources
flow back to home countries. These links could help to improve financial and
economic (among others) relations between host and home countries.
The structure of the paper is as follows: in Section 2 we discuss the related
literature. In Section 3 we provide some background information and discuss
the data and our sample. In Section 4 we introduce our estimation strategies
and we present our estimation results and robustness checks in Section 5.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Previous Literature
There exists a small theoretical literature which provides several explanations
for the determinants of temporary migration and optimal migration abroad.
On the one hand, temporary migration might be planned and part of an
optimal decision-making process based on the maximization of the total life-
time utility.5 In this set up, preferences for the home country or differences
in relative prices lead to a return even though income differentials persist
(see Djajic and Milbourne, 1988). Temporary migration might also serve
to accumulate savings, helping migrants to overcome budget constraints in
order to invest in the country of origin (Djajic 2010; Mesnard 2004). Higher
returns in the origin country to human capital acquired in the host coun-
try can be an additional motive for temporary migration (Dustmann, 1997).
However, income uncertainty in the host country might also imply higher
remittances by generating a higher likelihood of return migration (Delpierre
and Verheyden, 2014). On the other hand, remigration can be unplanned
and the result of failure either due to imperfect information about the host
country in terms of labor market prospects or cost of living or the inability
to fulfil the migration plans in terms of target savings (see e.g. Borjas and
5See for example, Djajic (1989). Dustmann and Go¨rlach (2016) provide a comprehen-
sive review of the theoretical and empirical literature on temporary migration.
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Bratsberg, 1996).
This paper focuses on the effects of temporary migration on immigrants’
behavior. The impact of temporary migration on remittances and trans-
fers to the country of origin has been one important question addressed in
this literature. For example, Dustmann and Mestres (2010) examine the
remittance behavior of immigrants and how it relates to temporary versus
permanent migration plans in Germany. They find that changes in remigra-
tion intentions are related to large changes in remittance flows. Merkle and
Zimmermann (1992) also find that guest-workers’ remigration plans are an
important determinant of remittances but their results are however less clear
cut for savings held in Germany. Bauer and Sinning (2011) instead examine
the relative savings position of migrant households in West Germany paying
particular attention to differences between temporary and permanent mi-
grants. If remittances are treated as savings, migrants who intend to return
to their home country save significantly more than comparable natives.
Another focus, yet not as common as remittances, has been that related to
investment in human capital measured as language proficiency. Dustmann
(1999) explores the effects of return migration on investment in the host
country’s language and finds that permanent migrants have a 10 percent
higher probability to be fluent in German than temporary migrants. Whether
those results hold in a country like France, whose national language is used
in some of the countries of origin, is interesting to test.
Those studies do not consider the potential trade-off between remittances
sent back home and saving/investment by the immigrant back home. In a
recent study, Wolff (2015) analyzes the impact of return decisions of foreign-
born retired individuals in France on remittances. Treating return intentions
as exogenous, he finds that they increase the probability of remitting by
more than 10 percentage points. The amount remitted is almost twice as
high for temporary migrants. Finally, he finds a positive correlation between
personal savings and remittances to origin country and between personal
savings and transfers to relatives living in France. Conversely, remittances to
origin country and family transfers in France tend to substitute each other. It
is important to note though that the behaviour of retired individuals may be
different from that of working age migrants, who are the focus here. Finally,
De Arcangelis and Joxhe (2015) analyze saving and remitting behavior on a
sample from the British Household Panel Survey. They find that temporary
migrants save less and remit more than permanent ones. However, they
rely on a noisy measure of remittances namely “giving money outside the
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household.” Our paper, unlike those two papers, examines several outcomes,
controlling for the endogeneity and tests for the potential trade-offs between
home and host outcomes.
In the next sections, we discuss our data and empirical strategy to study
the relationship between remigration intentions and immigrants’ behavior in
France.
3 Data
This section describes the data and provides some descriptive statistics on
the sample used. The analysis is based on the French dataset “Trajectoires
et origines” released by Ined-Insee in 2009. This large survey was conducted
among a representative sample of French metropolitan households of working
age between September 2008 and February 2009. Respondents can be clas-
sified in several subgroups: French, foreign-born or born in French Overseas
Territories (“De´partement et re´gion d’outre-mer”, hereafter DOM) and the
descendants of the respective categories born in France.
The survey sample consists of 21,761 observations and is representative
of all individuals born after 1958 (although some origin countries are over-
represented among first- and second-generation immigrants). The survey
explores the household’s migratory background, social, educational and eco-
nomic environment. It also includes questions on religious and linguistic
transmission and perception of discrimination. Moreover, it allows explor-
ing information on behavior relative to the origin country: does the migrant
send remittances, finance a project at origin or participate in the political
elections. Although we do not have a panel, our rich data set enable us
to observe heterogeneous behavior of immigrants at different stages of their
migration spells.
In this study, we focus on the behavioral differences among first-generation
migrants who state a desire to leave France versus those who do not. Our
interest lies in both host and origin country outcomes. This leaves a sample
of 9,168 observations (Table 1). Among these, 7.8% were born in a DOM
and 92.2% are foreign born. 15.7% of migrants (or 1,438 respondents) in
the sample stated a desire to leave France, while 24.9% answered the sur-
vey question with “maybe”. A majority of migrants (over 53.7%) stated a
desire to remain in France while 5.7% replied “don’t know”. In our bench-
mark specification, we contrast those that explicitly state a desire to leave,
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the temporary migrants, with the remainder, or permanent migrants (“Yes”
versus the rest). We check later the robustness of this definition.6
3.1 Differences between temporary and permanent migrants
INSERT Table 1 + 2 : Descriptive Stats
Tables 1 and 2 summarize the descriptive statistics for the full sample,
permanent and temporary migrants. As shown in Table 1, temporary mi-
grants (i.e. those who state a desire to leave) differ in their characteristics
from permanent migrants (i.e. those who do not state a desire to leave) along
several dimensions. Temporary migrants are on average younger than perma-
nent migrants at the time of the survey whereas they were not significantly
younger upon arrival. Hence, they have, on average, spent slightly less time
in France.7 About 65.1% of temporary migrants have a parent (father and/or
mother) at origin while only 52.6% of permanent migrants do. Permanent
migrants are also less likely to have a child living outside France.
As shown in Table 2, temporary migrants live proportionally less often
with a partner and have slightly more often a partner abroad. They tend
to be more educated than permanent migrants and are more concentrated
in big agglomerations. The fraction of employed is slightly higher among
temporary migrants while unemployment and inactivity are lower. They are
more likely to be wage earners and slightly less likely to be self-employed.
The fraction of students is also higher among them.
Examining the type of visa at arrival, unsurprisingly, the fraction of stu-
dent visas is higher among temporary migrants while that of respondents
who benefited from family reunion programs is lower.8 Asylum seekers make
up 5.5% of the temporary migrants and 11.5% of permanent. 26.7% of tem-
6In our main set of estimations, temporary migrants are all the individuals that state
a desire to leave France. Among these, 1082 (or 75%) explicitly state their partner’s or
their own country of origin as their intended destination. Among the 382 individuals who
mention a third country, the prevailing preferred destinations are North America (100
respondents) and the United Kingdom (37 respondents). We check the robustness of our
results by focusing on return migration exclusively in Section 5.3.
7Note that we control for age at arrival and age at the time of survey which implicitly
provides the duration of the migration spell (under the assumption that it was continuous).
8Although the legal status of immigrants can influence their intended duration of stay
(see Coniglio et al. 2009, 2010) the data that we use does not allow us to control for illegal
entry. These immigrants, if any, would be regrouped in the visa category “Other”.
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porary migrants have a legal visa waiver (i.e. individuals from the Schengen
area exempted from applying for a visa).
Focusing on the immigrants’ investment behavior, about 19.9% of tempo-
rary migrants regularly remit (send money to relatives in their origin coun-
try) compared to 14.1% among permanent migrants. Temporary migrants
are more likely to finance projects in their country of origin and own a house
at origin (30.3% versus 17.2%). They are however less likely to own a house
in France (28.4% versus 41.7%). Temporary migrants are also more inter-
ested in the politics of their country of origin and more likely to have voted
in an election related to the origin country.
Temporary migrants state a weaker improvement in French language be-
tween their date of arrival and the moment of the survey (46.5% against
60.6% among permanent migrants). This is partly due to their apparently
stronger French knowledge upon arrival. At the time of the survey, tempo-
rary migrants still seem to be more proficient in the French language than
permanent migrants.
As shown in Tables 1 and 2, permanent and temporary migrants are
statistically different along most observable characteristics (except for gender
and age at arrival) and behavioral choices. They are more likely to have
financial ties with their origin country and less likely to invest in France
compared to permanent migrants. Below, we examine whether this difference
in behavior between temporary and permanent migrants persists once we
control for individual characteristics and the potential endogeneity between
remigration plans and behavior.
4 Methodology
4.1 Remigration Intentions and Home Outcomes
Our first interest lies in determining how remigration intentions affect immi-
grants’ investment behavior, both in France and in their country of origin.
We first consider the following five binary investment outcomes related to
the country of origin: Physical investment: (i) whether they remit money to
the origin, (ii) whether they finance a project at origin, (iii) whether they
own a house at origin; Non-monetary investment: (iv) whether they have
an interest in the politics of their country of origin and (v) whether they
participate in elections at origin.
The main challenge is that remigration intentions are potentially endoge-
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nous to our outcomes of interest (i.e. immigrants’ behavior). An endogeneity
issue may arise due to the existence of confounding factors. More specifi-
cally, intrinsic attachment to the country of origin is potentially positively
correlated to both willingness to leave and outcomes such as remittances,
investment in the country of origin, participation in elections at origin etc.
This issue would bias our coefficient of interest upward. Furthermore, we
could have a reverse causality problem if outcomes such as owning a house
at origin or interest in the politics of the origin country were actually causing
the intention to leave, rather than the other way around.
To circumvent this issue, we use a plausibly exogenous shifter for remi-
gration intentions: opinion of the migrant about the level of discrimination
in France. The idea is that if migrants think that discrimination in France
is widespread, they are certainly more likely to be willing to leave or return
to their home country. de Coulon et al. (2016) confirmed this in a recent
quasi-experimental setting (i.e. the media coverage of a particularly tragic
murder committed by a Romanian immigrant in Italy). They find that ex-
posure to anti-immigrant attitudes impacts the intended duration of stay in
the host country. In particular, immigrants who experience an increase in
negative media feedback are those that predominantly increase their inten-
tion to leave. Moreover, the opinion about discrimination in France is not
likely to influence the outcomes through a channel other than remigration
intentions. This variable captures the perceived level of discrimination in
France in general, not particular discriminatory acts against the individual,
which could affect immigrant’s behavior beyond remigration intentions. One
might be concerned about the potential correlation between our instrument
and wages. Indeed, it is plausible that migrants in low-pay jobs tend to
think that discrimination is more widespread in France, by just generalizing
their own case. We control for socio-professional categories, which proxy for
income in the main model and check the robustness using income later.9
We estimate a recursive bivariate probit model where we estimate jointly
(i) remigration intentions and (ii) immigrants’ behaviour, but remigration
intention also appears in the immigrant’s outcome equation directly (i.e. we
use a recursive simultaneous equation model where both dependent variables
9Income is not used as a control in our benchmark estimations due to concerns about
self-selection of respondents to that question (see Section 5.3).
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are binary, and one of the dependent variables is endogenous), as follows:
Ri = α0 + α1Xi + α2Zi + ui (1.1)
BOi = β0 + β1Ri + β2Zi + vi, (1.2)
where BOi is a binary variable indicating migrant’s behaviour relative to the
origin country. Remigration intention is denoted byRi andXi is the exclusion
restriction with Xi=1 if the migrant believes that France is a very discrim-
inative country. Zi is a vector of individual characteristics (gender, marital
status, age, age at arrival, education, region of residence, urban status, region
of origin). Moreover, income could be correlated to both willingness to leave
and outcomes such as remittances or owning a house at origin. This could
in particular bias the coefficient of interest downwards if low income corre-
lates to a high willingness to remigrate. In order to mitigate this problem we
control for the employment status as well as socio-professional categories to
proxy for income. ui and vi are error terms distributed as bivariate normal,
each with a mean of zero, and variance-covariance matrix V , where V has
values of 1 on the leading diagonal.10
As argued by Wilde (2000) and similarly by Greene (2008), identification
is achieved through functional form in recursive bivariate models.11 However,
we still include exclusion restriction Xi to provide plausibly exogenous varia-
tion in remigration intentions, Ri. Our coefficient of interest is β1 capturing
the impact of remigration intentions on the outcome.
Though the bivariate probit is arguably the most suitable estimation tech-
nique in our case, we also run 2-stage least square (2SLS) as a robustness
check. The main disadvantage of that technique in our case is that it disre-
gards the binary nature of our outcomes so that marginal effects predicted
by the model might not lie between 0 and 1. The advantage instead is that
coefficients may be directly interpreted as marginal effects. It is also con-
venient to formally test the strength of our instruments. For completeness,
we also run a simple probit and a linear probability model to compare the
10Setting the variance to 1 is a normalisation that just transforms the variance covariance
matrix into a correlation matrix which is easier to interpret. This is a standard assumption
in bivariate probit models. See Greene (2008) and Monfardini and Santos Silva (2008).
11“In contrast to linear simultaneous equations with only continuous endogenous vari-
ables in recursive multiple equation probit models with endogenous dummy regressors no
exclusion restrictions for the exogenous variables are needed if there is sufficient variation
in the data. The last condition is ensured by the assumption that each equation contains
at least one varying exogenous regressor” (Wilde, 2000).
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coefficients with and without instrumentation in order to infer the sign of
the bias (see Tables 5 and A1).
4.2 Remigration Intentions and Host Outcomes
We use the same methodology to estimate the effect of remigration intentions
on outcomes that concern the host country, mainland France.
Ri = α0 + α1Yi + α2Zi + ui (1.3)
BFi = β0 + β1Ri + β2Zi + vi (1.4)
where BFi is migrants’ behavior in France and Ri is an indicator for the
remigration intention. As in equation 1.1, Zi is a vector of individual charac-
teristics and Yi is the exclusion restriction. The outcomes of interest here are
the binary variables that indicate monetary investment: (i) owning a house
in France; skill investment: (ii) improvement in French since arrival; and
non-monetary investment : (iii) interest in French politics.
There is again a potential endogeneity problem and in particular a risk
of reverse causality, in the sense that little investment in France may lead to
poor economic outcomes and a higher willingness to remigrate. For example,
an individual could want to leave because she has not managed to buy a
house in France. Therefore, for identification and rather than relying solely
on functional form, we use an instrument that captures the attachment to the
home country but does not affect the investment decision in France through
any additional channel. We use whether individuals want to be buried in
France or abroad (i.e. Yi=1 if individuals want to be buried outside France
and 0 otherwise), as those who would like to be buried in France are less likely
to intend to remigrate. Burial place should not be correlated with interest in
French politics, French language improvement nor owning a house in France
by any other channel than that of remigration intentions. We assume that
burial intentions are less likely to be revised as a consequence of the more or
less successful current migration experience, but still are an important driver
of remigration intentions in the long-run.
As in the previous subsection, our baseline specification uses a recursive
bivariate probit estimation procedure. However, we repeat the exercise us-
ing 2SLS and compare these results to their non-instrumented counterparts
namely simple probit and linear probability model.
It is important to discuss here a limitation of our data, namely that
we only observe individuals at one point in time. Therefore, we are not
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able to control for previous behavior that might be correlated with current
decisions. In other words, it is possible that individuals do not invest at
origin (i.e. remit) today because they have done so in the past or plan to do
so in the future though they still plan to leave. Thus, our estimates could be
downward biased for the outcomes (i.e. such as remittances). However, since
we study an array of outcomes, it is unlikely that a bias is encountered across
all outcomes. Moreover, our interest is in how current remigration intention
affects current behavior.
4.3 Trade-off between Outcomes
Finally, we study the existence of a potential trade-off/complementarity be-
tween home and host outcomes caused by remigration intentions. More pre-
cisely, we want to uncover whether temporary migrants tend to substitute
investment in the host country by investment in the origin country. We want
to know how remigration intentions affect immigrants’ behavior at home ver-
sus host countries e.g. are temporary migrants less likely to remit if they are
investing in a house in France, or are temporary migrants less likely to invest
in a house at origin if they are investing in a house in France? To this end,
we estimate the following 3-equation recursive multivariate probit model:
Ri = α0 + α1Xi + α2Zi + ui (2.1)
BOi = β0 + β1Ri + β2Pi + β3Zi + vi (2.2)
BFi = γ0 + γ1Ri + γ2Zi + wi (2.3)
Ri, BOi and BFi are, as previously, remigration intention, investment in
the country of origin and investment in France respectively. Zi is a vector of
individual characteristics. ui, vi and wi are error terms distributed as multi-
variate normal, each with a mean of zero, and variance-covariance matrix V ,
where V has values of 1 on the leading diagonal and correlations ρjk = ρkj,
with (i, j, k) ∈ 1, 2, 3, as off-diagonal elements. The model has a structure
similar to that of a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model, except that
the dependent variables are binary indicators. As for the SUR case, the
equations need not include exactly the same set of explanatory variables.
We face the same endogeneity issues as previously but have one additional
equation to estimate. Consequently, we need a second exclusion restriction
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in order to assess the potentially causal pathway between remigration inten-
tions and the outcomes. To this end, we instrument remigration intention by
Xi opinion about discrimination in France as done previously. Additionally,
we use Pi presence of a parent (mother and/or father) abroad as an exclusion
restriction for the country of origin outcome. The idea is that, controlling
for observable characteristics, the presence of a parent abroad should induce
individuals to increase their investment in the country of origin, be it either
financially (remittances, project, ownership) or non financially (political in-
terest and participation). Yet, it should not affect directly the intention to
leave nor the host country outcome (such as own a house in France, interest
in French politics or language improvement in French).
We focus on trade-offs between home and host-country outcomes since it
is challenging to identify an instrument that would predict only one of two
outcomes in the same country, without affecting the other one directly. Be-
cause it is not clear how financial and non financial outcomes are intertwined,
we start by analyzing the purely monetary outcomes trade-offs followed by
the non-monetary outcome trade-offs.
5 Empirical Analysis
5.1 Remigration Intentions and Migrants’ Investment Behavior
Table 3 presents our main set of results using the recursive bivariate probit.
Standard errors are clustered at the country of origin level.12 Remigration
intentions increase the probability to invest in the origin country as shown by
the positive, albeit not always significant, coefficients in the first five columns.
On the other hand, intention to remigrate tends to decrease the probability to
invest in the host country, as shown by the negative coefficients in columns
(6) to (8). For host country outcomes, the negative effect of remigration
intention is very significant for improvement in French and house ownership
in France, but not significant (although signed consistently) for interest in
politics in France.
INSERT Table 3: Bi-probit: Full sample and Africans only
INSERT Table 4: Bi-probit: Predicted probabilities
12Results are highly robust to clustering at the region of residence level. Tables are
available upon request.
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The pattern described earlier seems to be heavily driven by migrants from
Africa, the most important immigrant group in France. Indeed, those who
desire to leave increase significantly their investment towards their origin
country and decrease that in France. Only interest in politics in France is
not significantly affected by remigration intention for this subsample.
Interestingly, in terms of language skills, we find that those who plan
to remigrate are less likely to have experienced improvements compared to
those who intend to stay. We control for the level of French upon arrival
and whether the country of origin and France share French as an official lan-
guage or if French is spoken by at least 9% of the population (as in Mayer
and Zingano, 2011). Furthermore, improvement in French between time of
arrival and the time of survey is not only based on self-reporting but also
on a French test that was administrated as part of the survey.13 Another
interesting finding is that remigration intentions increase interest in politics
and participation in elections at origin, particularly for Africans, suggest-
ing another channel through which temporary migration impacts economic
development and political institutions at home.
Table 4 shows by how much intention to leave affects outcomes. In order
to get the magnitude of the effect, we predict the following probabilities:
P [BOi = 1|Ri = 1] and P [BOi = 1|Ri = 0], where BOi is the outcome at
origin and Ri is the intention to remigrate. Thus, we can observe how the
probability of each of the outcomes (e.g. to remit) is affected by the inten-
tion to leave. In the full sample, remigration intention does not significantly
impact the likelihood of monetary investment at origin (except increasing
the probability of investing in a project at origin) but does increase political
interest and political participation at origin. At the same time, intention to
leave decreases the probability to own a house in France by about 22 per-
centage points (p.p.) and that to improve in French by 12 p.p.. For African
immigrants, remigration intentions have a substantial impact on the proba-
bility of remitting and investing at home, whilst also reducing the incentives
to invest in France. Conditional on intention to remigrate, 54% of African
immigrants are likely to remit compared to 20% if they are not planning to
leave. The probability of non-monetary outcomes also increases by a large
amount with (59 and 48 percentage points respectively for the probability to
participate in elections and to be interested in politics at origin).
13As a robustness, we checked whether immigrants enrolled in French classes since ar-
rival, but the sample is too small for any robust analysis.
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Now, we run a naive probit model, as if remigration intentions were ex-
ogenous, in order to check whether instrumenting makes a big difference.
The general pattern remains similar: positive coefficient on remigration in-
tention for outcomes related to the origin country and negative for outcomes
in France. However, some differences arise. In the full sample probit, rem-
igration intentions appear to matter significantly for all outcomes except
for owning a house in France, while they do not for remitting and owning a
house at origin in the bi-probit. In all cases when remigration intentions turn
out significant, the coefficient is bigger in the bi-probit than in the probit,
pleading for the presence of an attenuation bias when we do not instrument.
INSERT Table 5: Probit: Full sample and Africans only
For comparison purposes, we repeat the exercise using a 2SLS procedure
instead of the bivariate probit and a linear probability model (LPM) instead
of the probit. Results are presented in Tables A1 and A2. The picture
remains overall similar. Indeed, the coefficient on remigration intentions is
generally positive for outcomes related to the origin country and negative
for outcomes in France. In the full sample 2SLS, significance is not achieved
only for owning a house and participation in elections at origin, as well as
interest in politics in France. The effect of remigration intentions is stronger
in the subsample of Africans. Looking at F-statistics of the first stage, we
find that our instruments are not weak as the value is above 10. Using the
comparison with the LPM, we confirm that coefficients are larger in absolute
value in the 2SLS, reinforcing the idea that the instrumentation is useful to
correct an attenuation bias.
5.2 Remigration Intentions and Joint Home-Host Investment
Decisions
One interesting question we tackle is whether remigration intentions still im-
pact investment decisions when we consider them jointly. In particular, we
examine the possible trade-off between behavior at origin (BOi) and behav-
ior at host (BFi). To this end, we first run a linear specification (3SLS) to
check the significance of our instruments. We find that our two instrumen-
tal variables (opinion about discrimination and parent abroad) are overall
significant in the full sample (see Table A3).
We then run our multiple equation probit estimations as described in Sec-
tion 4.2. Table A4 shows the full results. We focus on marginal probabilities
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shown in Table 6 and 7 for simplicity. We calculate the probabilities of BOi
and BFi conditional on desiring to remigrate. We compute the probability
of BOi = 1 and of BFi = 1 fixing Ri to 0 and 1 successively.
INSERT Table 6: Tri-probit: Predicted probabilities - Full sample
INSERT Table 7: Tri-probit: Predicted probabilities - Africans only
Results for the full sample show the existence of a substantial substitution
effect between investment in the origin country and in France, in particular
for monetary outcomes. Temporary migrants are at the same time more
likely to remit, have a project or own a house at origin and less likely to own
a house in France or improve in French. On the other hand, non-monetary
outcomes at origin and in France seem to be complementary. Indeed, tempo-
rary migrants are both more likely to be interested in politics at origin and
in France. The same complementarity holds for participation in elections at
origin.
When we focus on migrants from Africa only, the picture is qualitatively
similar but the effect of remigration intentions on outcomes in France de-
creases in size and loses significance. We interpret these results as suggestive
evidence of the existence of a trade-off between investing at origin and at des-
tination for temporary migrants. However, we should also take these results
with caution as they become less significant when we focus on the subsample
of Africans only. This could be due to the reduction in the sample size, but
also to the fact that we look only at extensive and not intensive margins. Mi-
grants may find it optimal to keep a diverse portfolio even if they decide to
remigrate. Nevertheless, some substitution on the intensive margin between
investment at home and at host could be occurring, but we do not observe
it in this data.
Finally, we examine the possibility of trade-offs between two home mon-
etary outcomes, namely: remitting and owning a house at origin; remitting
and investing in a project at origin and finally owning a house at origin and
investing in a project at origin. Finding a valid exclusion restriction in this
case is problematic since we are dealing with two home outcomes simulta-
neously. We therefore rely on the functional form for identification. Table
A5 provides results for the three possible pairwise combinations of monetary
home outcomes, using a trivariate probit model with a remigration intention
equation (and remigration intention as a control in the two equations of the
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home variables). We find that the correlations between the two home out-
comes are always positive and significant. Thus, overall this suggests that
there is a complementarity between the home outcomes we are examining.
Overall our results using the trivariate probit reinforce those from the
bi-probit analysis. Indeed, we can confirm that not only does intention to
remigrate affect both investment at host and at home in opposite directions,
but as well that it is very likely that temporary migrants do substitute the
former for the latter. Of course more research is required on the topic, in
particular using panel data and intensive margin decisions.
5.3 Robustness checks
(a) Definition of Temporary: In order to test the robustness of our results,
we first change the way we define the intention to leave France by includ-
ing respondents who answered the question on the intention to leave France
with “Maybe” among temporary migrants. Table A6 shows that results are
globally consistent. The only notable difference is that a larger definition of
intention to leave France significantly increases the effect we find on remit-
tances. This is indicative that our results mainly dwell upon the comparison
between migrants who are certain either to leave France or to remain, rather
than upon a possible misclassification of migrants with uncertain plans.
Secondly, we focus on temporary migrants only and compare the behavior
of those who have taken steps towards leaving from those who have not in
Table A7. Individuals who have started to plan their departure from France
are more likely to have invested at origin, to be interested in politics in
France while being significantly less likely to own in France. These somewhat
weaker results could be due to the large drop in sample size when we focus
on temporary migrants only. They could also be due to the fact that we
look at a subsample that is overall more homogenous as they all stated some
desire to leave. It may explain in particular the lack of effect we observe on
political interest and participation in elections at origin. Combined with the
drop in sample size and increased homogeneity, both the fact that we look
only at extensive margin decisions and the cross-sectional nature of the data
may also help to explain the differences in results.
(b) Leave and Return: We investigate whether our results are driven
primarily by migrants wishing to return to their origin country or by those
wishing to migrate in a third country. In Table A8, we first define temporary
migrants as those who wish to return to their country of origin and compare
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them to all other observations (except those who express a desire to leave
France for a third country). The only difference with the baseline estimation
is that project of origin is no longer significantly impacted by a return deci-
sion. Then, we compare return migrants to stayers only (i.e. those who state
a clear desire to remain in France, removing those who answer “I don’t know”
or “maybe”) and find that improvement in French is no longer significant,
although keeping the negative sign. Finally, we compare those who wish to
leave (i.e. return to origin or leave to a third country) to stayers. Results are
consistent with the benchmark specification. The pattern of a positive effect
of remigration intention on outcomes related to the origin country and nega-
tive effect for outcomes in France holds qualitatively in all instances, whereas
only marginal changes in the magnitude of the coefficients are observed in
most cases.
(c) Sample Selections: We additionally run several checks trimming
the sample in different directions. In Table A9, we restrict the sample to
individuals who accepted to declare their income in order to see whether
controlling for income would change our results. Although this procedure
biases the sample, as a large proportion of the self-employed respondents
is dropped, our previous results still hold. We also run our estimations
excluding individuals aged 16 or less at the moment of arrival (often referred
to as generation 1.5, as they lie between the first and the second generation
of immigrants). It can be argued that these immigrants did not take the
decision to migrate themselves but were rather following their family. Given
that they have spent part of their youth and a substantial part of their life
in France, their attachment and behavior towards their country of origin
might differ from migrants who moved to France in order to work there (i.e.
first generation migrants). These individuals constitute roughly one third of
our sample. Table A10 shows that results remain largely consistent when
we exclude them from our sample, with the sole exception that remigration
intention significantly decreases interest in French politics among immigrants
who were older than 16 when they arrived in France. For similar concerns,
we also repeat the exercise excluding students from the sample, as they may
be motivated by very different reasons than other migrants. Results in Table
A11 are very similar to the baseline estimations.
In the same spirit, in Table A12, we run our estimations on a sub-sample
excluding individuals born in DOM, i.e. French Oversea Territories. Given
that these 712 individuals generally have the French nationality and free
mobility between their territory of origin and mainland France, they could
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be expected to behave differently from other immigrants. Investing in a
project at origin is no longer significantly affected by intention to leave. The
rest of our baseline results remain however broadly consistent in terms of
sign and size of the coefficient of interest.
(d) Alternative Instrumentation: We also explore alternative ways of
instrumenting in Table A13. In particular, we use an additional instrument
on top of those already described. Namely, we construct the share of migrants
who declare they wish to leave France by country of origin and assign this
share to each individual in the sample. The idea is that migrants belonging
to communities who are on average more likely to desire to leave France
should tend to be influenced in that direction. We keep the first instrument
as well in order not to rely uniquely on cross-origin country variation in the
instrument. Results remain very similar to those with only one instrument.
The only notable difference is that intention to leave significantly increases
home ownership at origin in this specification.
6 Conclusion
This paper studies how remigration intentions affect immigrants’ behavior.
Using a unique French data set, we analyze the relationship between remi-
gration intentions and several immigrants’ outcomes in the host and origin
country. The findings show that temporary migrants behave differently from
permanent ones. Temporary migrants are more likely to display higher at-
tachment to the home country, in particular in the form of non-monetary out-
comes such as political interest. Also, remigration intentions are associated
with lower monetary and non-monetary (human capital and political) invest-
ment in the host country. Examining the potential trade-off between home
and host countries’ outcomes, we find a negative correlation (i.e. a trade-
off) between immigrants’ investments at the home and at the host country:
immigrants who intend to remigrate significantly decrease their investment
in France while simultaneously increasing their investment at origin. How-
ever, interestingly, we do find complementarity between interest in politics
at home and host countries. Furthermore, home outcomes seem to exhibit
some complementarity: an immigrant who uses one investment channel to-
wards her origin country (i.e. remit) is also more likely to use a second one
(i.e. invest in a project).
Immigrants from Africa, the main region of origin, significantly increase
their monetary (and non-monetary) investment at origin and decrease their
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investment in France when they intend to leave France. The observed trade-
off between home and host outcomes for African immigrants is however not
as strong and significant as for the full sample.
Overall, our results suggest that temporary migrants behave differently
from permanent ones in the host country and particularly tend to limit their
non-monetary investment such as the host country’s language. Moreover, our
findings suggest that there might potentially be a trade-off between home and
host investments for temporary migrants. This might limit their assimilation
in the host country, which can be particularly problematic if remigration
intentions do not materialize. Hence, those behavioral differences should be
taken into account in the migration policy debate, in particular at times were
temporary migration policies are increasingly preferred over other migration
schemes by many governments.
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Appendices
A Descriptive statistics of the sample used
The survey we use is representative of the total French population. The
sample of immigrants is drawn from the 2007 French Census. It is stratified in
order to be representative of the full immigrant population aged 18-59 living
in France, but making sure at the same time that origins that are too scarce
to be surveyed in sufficient numbers using a random sampling methodology
reach reasonable sizes. These scarce origins have been chosen to allow the
comparison with a previous survey called MGIS, ”Mobilite´ Ge´ographique
et Insertion Sociale” (geographic mobility and social inclusion) and include
immigrants from Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, Turkey, Central Africa, the
Gulf of Guinea and Western Sahel. A considerable effort has been put by
the designers of the survey to ensure representativeness of the data.
The sample that we use is restricted to the first generation immigrants
(i.e. individuals born outside mainland France). The mean age in the sample
is 41.5 years and mean age at arrival is 19.9 years. 53.1% of the sample is
female. 73.4% of respondents share the household with a partner, 24.9% are
single while the remaining 1.7% have a partner living outside the household.
22.3% live in agglomerations with less than 50,000 inhabitants and 64.8%
in agglomerations with more than 200,000 inhabitants. 16.6% completed
primary, 27.4% secondary school and 14.9% a vocational training. 22.6%
finished up to 2 years of college and 18.6% have a master degree.
68% of respondents are active and employed (60.7% of respondents are
waged and 7.3% self-employed) while 9.3% are unemployed. 3.5% of respon-
dents are students and 19.2% are inactive (including the retired). Almost one
third (30.2%) of the respondents benefited from a family reunion program
or married a French citizen. 15.4% own a worker visa and 11.1% a student
visa. Asylum seekers make up 10.6% of the sample while 15% of respondents
benefited from a legal visa waiver. 54.6% of respondents have a parent at
origin country and 7.5% a child. 39.7% own a house in France.
The survey allows to proxy the links kept with origin country. 21.8% of
respondents state that they send remittances to people outside their house-
hold and 12.1% finance a project at origin. 16.3% participate in political
elections at origin.
The language skills that migrants had upon arrival are variable. 40% state
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Table 1: Characteristics of immigrants by remigration intention
Full sample Intention to leave Intention to stay Difference
Sample Size 9168 1438 7730
(% of total) 15.7 % 84.3 %
Age in 2008 (average) 41.5 39.4 41.9 2.556∗∗∗
Age at Arrival 19.9 20.4 19.8 -0.504
Female (% of the sample) 53.1 % 51.3 % 53.5 % 0.022
Parent at origin (% Yes) 54.5 % 65.1 % 52.6 % -0.125∗∗∗
Child at origin (% Yes) 7.5 % 8.8 % 7.2 % -0.015∗∗
Burial intention outside France 31.4 % 55.0 % 27.0 % -0.280∗∗∗
Opinion on discrimination (often versus rest) 42.7 % 54.8 % 40.4 % -0.144∗∗∗
Investment Behaviour
Remit 15.0 % 19.9 % 14.1 % -0.058∗∗∗
Own house outside France 19.3 % 30.3 % 17.2 % -0.130∗∗∗
Project at origin 1.3 % 2.6 % 1.0 % -0.070∗∗∗
Own house in France 39.7 % 28.4 % 41.7 % 0.133∗∗∗
Participation in elections outside France 15.9 % 19.1 % 15.3 % -0.038∗∗∗
Interest for politics in country of origin 15.0 % 22.5 % 13.6 % -0.133∗∗∗
Interest for politics in France 21.1 % 22.8 % 20.8 % 0.197∗
Language Improvement 58.4 % 46.5 % 60.6 % 0.142∗∗∗
Note: T-test for difference between the two groups. ***, **, and * represent 1 %, 5 % and 10 %
significance levels, respectively.
that they did not speak French at all while 1.3% stated a very good level
at speaking and understanding and 26.9% a proficient level in everything.
58.4% however declare that language skills improved since arrival and 52.1%
declare to be proficient in all the aspects of French language at the time of
survey.
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Table 2: Characteristics of immigrants by remigration intention, continued
Full sample Intention to leave Intention to stay Pearson’s χ2 (p-value)
Origin 477.905 (0.000)
DOM 7.8 % 19.7 % 5.5 %
Europe 25.7 % 22.2 % 26.4 %
North Africa 24.3 % 14.3 % 26.1 %
Subsaharan Africa 15.3 % 22.7 % 13.9 %
Asia 21.3 % 15.6 % 22.3 %
Other 5.7 % 5.5 % 5.7 %
Completed education 24.698 (0.000)
Up to primary 16.6 % 15.6 % 16.8 %
Secondary schooling 27.4 % 25.0 % 27.8 %
Vocational training 14.9 % 13.4 % 15.2 %
Up to bachelor degree 22.6 % 23.2 % 22.5 %
Master degree 18.6 % 22.9 % 17.8 %
Marital Status 52.375 (0.000)
Single 24.9 % 30.1 % 23.9 %
Cohabiting partner 73.4 % 66.7 % 74.7 %
Non-Cohabiting partner 1.7 % 3.2 % 1.4 %
Size of residence place 70.753 (0.000)
< 50.000 inhab. 22.3 % 16.7 % 23.4 %
< 200.000 inhab. 12.9 % 10.7 % 13.3 %
< 1.000.000 inhab. 26.2 % 24.6 % 26.5 %
> 1.000.000 inhab. 38.6 % 48.0 % 36.9 %
Employment status 83.028 (0.000)
Active
Waged 60.7 % 62.3 % 60.4 %
Self-Employed 7.3 % 6.4 % 7.5 %
Unemployed 9.3 % 8.4 % 9.5 %
Inactive (including retired) 19.2 % 15.6 % 19.8 %
Students 3.5 % 7.2 % 2.8 %
Employment category 24.426 (0.000)
Business owners and managing positions 16.4 % 15.8 % 16.6 %
Intermediate positions 12.7 % 14.3 % 12.4 %
Clerks and employes 24.9 % 26.2 % 24.7 %
Workers 28.5 % 23.8 % 29.4 %
Never worked and other inactive 17.4 % 20.0 % 16.9 %
Visa type at arrival 255.743 (0.000)
Family Reunion or
Married French citizen 30.2 % 24.0 % 31.3 %
Worker visa 15.4 % 16.1 % 15.3 %
Student visa 11.1 % 14.5 % 10.4 %
Asylum 10.6 % 5.5 % 11.5 %
Visa waiver 15.0 % 26.7 % 12.8 %
Other visa 17.8 % 13.3 % 18.6 %
French skills at arrival 156.206 (0.000)
Not at all 40.0 % 31.7 % 41.6 %
Knows some French 31.7 % 26.5 % 32.7 %
Understands and speaks 1.3 % 1.4 % 1.3 %
Proficient 26.9 % 40.3 % 24.4 %
Note: Pearson’s χ2 gives the p-value associated to the hypothesis that the rows and columns in a two-way
table are independent.
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Table 3: Recursive Bi-probit: Full sample and Africans only
Origin country outcomes Host country outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Outcome of Remit Project Owning Participation Interest in Interest in Improve Own house
interest at origin a house in elections politics politics French in France
(equation 2) at origin at origin outside France in France
Full Sample
Eq. 2.2 Outcome of interest
Intention to leave 0.160 0.502∗∗ 0.206 1.679∗∗∗ 0.984∗∗∗ -0.199 -0.934∗∗∗ -0.785∗∗∗
(0.245) (0.225) (0.421) (0.198) (0.217) (0.195) (0.203) (0.144)
Eq. 2.1 Intention to leave
Exclusion restriction
Opinion about 0.250∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗ 0.263∗∗∗
Discrimination (0.048) (0.048) (0.047) (0.043) (0.044)
Burial intention 0.732∗∗∗ 0.726∗∗∗ 0.740∗∗∗
outside France (0.064) (0.083) (0.061)
Observations 9168 9168 9168 9168 9168 9168 7080 9168
ρ 0.014 -0.087 0.169 -0.729∗∗∗ -0.313∗∗ 0.129 0.427∗∗∗ 0.357∗∗∗
Log-likelihood -6832.513 -6771.006 7623.743 -7283.522 -7392.821 -7761.264 -4358.640 -8193.312
Model Wald test 0.010 0.467 0.539 29.925∗∗∗ 6.204∗∗ 1.144 12.335∗∗∗ 13.336∗∗∗
Africans only
Eq. 2.2 Outcome of interest
Intention to leave 1.076∗∗∗ 1.643∗∗∗ 1.003∗∗ 1.786∗∗∗ 1.452∗∗∗ 0.016 -0.937∗∗∗ -0.495∗∗
(0.274) (0.209) (0.433) (0.307) (0.218) (0.342) (0.169) (0.252)
Eq. 2.1 Intention to leave
Exclusion restriction
Opinion about 0.438∗∗∗ 0.436∗∗∗ 0.415∗∗∗ 0.348∗∗∗ 0.426∗∗∗
Discrimination (0.042) (0.039) (0.039) (0.050) (0.037)
Burial intention 0.497∗∗∗ 0.513∗∗∗ 0.504∗∗∗
Outside France (0.074) (0.079) (0.072)
Observations 3627 3627 3627 3627 3627 3627 3402 3627
ρ -0.411 ∗∗ -0.652∗∗∗ -0.286 -0.825∗∗∗ -0.568∗∗∗ 0.023 0.417∗∗∗ 0.236
Log-likelihood -3118.040 -2776.971 -3059.112 -2967.841 -2995.259 -3285.660 -2377.875 -3065.007
Model Wald test 6.380∗∗ 20.367∗∗∗ 1.375 11.436∗∗∗ 14.834∗∗∗ 0.012 14.129∗∗∗ 2.283
Note: In all specifications, we control for gender, marital status, age, age at arrival, educational attainment (5 categories), urban status, employment status, region
of origin (6 regions), region of residence in France (28 regions), socio-professional category (5 categories), presence of a child abroad and presence of a parent
(mother and/or father) abroad. Additionally, we control for proficiency in French upon arrival in column (7). We lose 2088 observations in this specification for
the full sample as we drop migrants from the French Overseas Territories and all migrants who were perfectly proficient in French upon arrival. Standard errors
are clustered at the country of origin level.
Table 4: Recursive Bi-probit: Predicted probabilities
Full Sample African migrants
Conditional on Diff. Conditional on Diff.
Int. leave Not Int. leave Not
(1) Remit 17.7 14.4 3.3 53.6 19.8 33.8∗∗∗
(2) Project at origin 21.9 10.6 11.3∗∗ 62.4 10.7 51.7∗∗∗
(3) House at origin 23.7 18.4 5.3 48.3 17.3 31.0∗∗
(4) Election at origin 65.0 13.0 52.0∗∗∗ 73.0 13.6 59.4∗∗∗
(5) Int. politics at origin 42.2 12.9 29.3∗∗∗ 61.6 13.5 48.1∗∗∗
(6) Int. politics in France 17.1 22.1 -5.0 26.5 26.0 0.5
(7) Improved French 46.8 58.5 -11.7∗∗∗ 32.6 47.4 -14.8∗∗∗
(8) House in France 21.7 43.4 -21.7∗∗∗ 15.4 26.9 -11.5∗∗
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Table 5: Probit: Full sample and Africans only
Origin country outcomes Host country outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Outcome of Remit Project Owning Participation Interest in Interest in Improve Own house
interest at origin a house in elections politics politics French in France
at origin at origin outside France in France
Full sample
Intention to leave 0.185∗∗∗ 0.345∗∗∗ 0.513∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗∗ 0.421∗∗∗ 0.019 -0.211∗∗∗ -0.185∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.044) (0.048) (0.050) (0.038) (0.045) (0.078) (0.049)
Observations 9168 9168 9168 9168 9168 9168 7080 9168
Africa only
Intention to leave 0.204∗∗∗ 0.329∗∗∗ 0.485∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗ 0.355∗∗∗ 0.012 -0.220∗∗∗ -0.001
(0.038) (0.063) (0.043) (0.066) (0.042) (0.055) (0.081) (0.054)
Observations 3627 3627 3627 3627 3627 3627 3402 3627
Note: in all specifications, we control for gender, marital status, age, age at arrival, educational attainment (5 categories), urban status, employment status,
region of origin (6 regions), region of residence in France (28 regions), socio-professional category (5 categories), presence of a child abroad and presence
of a parent (mother and/or father) abroad. Additionally, we control for proficiency in French upon arrival in column (7). We lose 2088 observations in
this specification for the full sample as we drop migrants from the French Overseas Territories as they were all perfectly proficient in French upon arrival.
Standard errors are clustered at the country of origin level.
Table 6: Tri-probit: Full sample - Predicted probabilities
Full Sample
Conditional on Diff.
Intention to leave Not
(1) Remit 18.1 14.4 3.7∗
House in France 33.7 40.8 - 7.1∗∗
(2) Project at origin 20.3 10.8 9.5∗∗∗
House in France 33.7 40.8 -7.1∗∗
(3) House at origin 31.2 17.2 14∗∗∗
House in France 33.6 40.8 -7.2 ∗∗
(4) Remit 19.7 14.7 5∗
French language improvement 58.7 62.9 -4.2∗∗∗
(5) Project at origin 20.5 11.3 9.2∗∗∗
French language improvement 58.7 62.9 -4.2∗∗∗
(6) House at origin 34.9 16.8 18.1∗∗∗
French language improvement 58.6 62.9 -4.3∗∗∗
(7) Interest in politics at origin 27.1 13.0 14.1∗∗∗
French language improvement 58.6 62.9 -4.3∗∗∗
(8) Election at origin 31.3 15.8 15.5∗∗∗
French language improvement 58.6 63.0 -4.4∗∗∗
(9) Election at origin 27.7 14.4 13.3∗∗∗
Interest in politics in France 26.8 20.2 6.6∗∗
(10) Interest in politics at origin 27.2 14.4 12.8∗∗∗
Interest in politics in France 25.5 20.4 5.1∗
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Table 7: Tri-probit: Predicted probabilities - African migrants
African migrants
Conditional on Diff.
Intention to leave Not
(1) Remit 34.7 21.6 13.1∗
House in France 23.7 25.2 -1.5
(2) Project at origin 28.5 12.0 16.5∗∗∗
House in France 24 25.1 -1.1
(3) House at origin 36.0 18.4 17.6∗∗∗
House in France 23.7 25.2 -1.5
(4) Remit 37.0 21.4 15.6∗∗∗
French language imp. 42.7 45.2 -2.5
(5) Project at origin 32.6 12.0 20.6∗∗∗
French language imp. 42.5 45.2 -2.7
(6) House at origin 34.1 18.3 15.8∗∗∗
French language imp. 42.6 45.2 -2.6
(7) Int. politics origin 37.5 13.9 23.6∗∗∗
French language imp. 42.8 45.1 -2.3
(8) Election at origin 23.4 15.4 8.0∗∗∗
French language imp. 42.4 45.2 -2.8
(9) Election at origin 20.5 15.7 4.8
Int. politics France 31.1 25.3 5.8
(10) Int. politics origin 26.9 15.9 11.0∗∗∗
Int. politics France 31.3 25.2 6.1
Table A1: LPM: Full sample and Africans only
Origin country outcomes Host country outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Outcome of Remit Project Owning Participation Interest in Interest in Improve Own house
interest at origin a house in elections politics politics French in France
at origin at origin outside France in France
Full Sample
Outcome of interest
Intention to leave 0.033∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.005 -0.028∗∗ -0.058∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.011) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015)
Observations 9168 9168 9168 9168 9168 9168 7080 9168
R2 0.145 0.050 0.103 0.063 0.065 0.088 0.567 0.264
Africa
Outcome of interest
Intention to leave 0.098∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.039∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.017 -0.033∗ -0.024
(0.017) (0.017) (0.012) (0.023) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016)
Observations 3627 3627 3627 3627 3627 3627 3402 3627
R2 0.140 0.060 0.110 0.033 0.055 0.107 0.537 0.192
Note: In all specifications, we control for gender, marital status, age, age at arrival, educational attainment (5 categories), urban status, employment status, region
of origin (6 regions), region of residence in France (28 regions), socio-professional category (5 categories), presence of a child abroad and presence of a parent
(mother and/or father) abroad. Additionally, we control for proficiency in French upon arrival in column (7). We lose 2088 observations in this specification for
the full sample as we drop migrants from the French Overseas Territories and all migrants who were perfectly proficient in French upon arrival. Standard errors
are clustered at the country of origin level.
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Table A2: 2SLS: Full sample and Africans only
Origin country outcomes Host country outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Outcome of Remit Project Owning Participation Interest in Interest in Improve Own house
interest at origin a house in elections politics politics French in France
(equation 2) at origin at origin outside France in France
Full Sample
Eq. 2.2 Outcome of interest
Intention to leave 0.486∗∗∗ 0.341∗∗∗ 0.049 0.210 0.628∗∗∗ 0.010 -0.279∗∗∗ -0.489∗∗∗
(0.182) (0.127) (0.145) (0.176) (0.129) (0.061) (0.096) (0.119)
Eq. 2.1 Intention to leave
Exclusion restriction
Opinion about 0.074∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗
Discrimination (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Burial intention 0.171∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗
Outside France (0.030) (0.027) (0.030)
Observations 9168 9168 9168 9168 9168 9168 7080 9168
F-stat 25.33 25.33 25.33 25.33 25.33 32.64 29.16 32.64
Africa
Eq. 2.2 Outcome of interest
Intention to leave 0.665∗∗∗ 0.605∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗ 0.060 0.612∗∗∗ 0.002 -0.282∗∗∗ -0.361∗∗
(0.174) (0.121) (0.139) (0.186) (0.136) (0.107) (0.094) (0.159)
Eq. 2.1 Intention to leave
Exclusion restriction
Opinion about 0.088∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗
Discrimination (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Burial intention 0.111∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗
Outside France (0.024) (0.025) (0.024)
Observations 3627 3627 3627 3627 3627 3627 3402 3627
F-stat 29.17 29.17 29.17 29.17 29.17 21.32 19.61 21.32
Note: In all specifications, we control for gender, marital status, age, age at arrival, educational attainment (5 categories), urban status, employment status, region
of origin (6 regions), region of residence in France (28 regions), socio-professional category (5 categories), presence of a child abroad and presence of a parent (mother
and/or father) abroad. Additionally, we control for proficiency in French upon arrival in column (7). We lose 2088 observations in this specification for the full
sample as we drop migrants from the French Overseas Territories as they were all perfectly proficient in French upon arrival. Standard errors are clustered at the
country of origin level.
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Table A5: Home-Home outcomes
(1) (2) (3)
Remit Remit Project origin
b/se b/se b/se
Int. to leave 0.181 0.197 0.380∗∗∗
(0.142) (0.149) (0.066)
Project origin
Int. to leave 0.283∗∗∗
(0.025)
Own origin 0.449∗∗∗ 0.468∗∗∗
Int. to leave (0.134) (0.135)
Observations 9168 9168 9168
Rho12 0.223
∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗
Note: This table provides results for a trivariate probit model
where the two equations with home outcomes as dependent vari-
able have intention to leave as a control and the third equation
has intention to leave as a dependent variable.
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Table A6: Bi-probit: Intention to leave “Yes” and “Maybe”
Origin country outcomes Host country outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Outcome of Remit Project Owning Participation Interest in Interest in Improve Own house
interest at origin a house in elections politics politics French in France
(equation 2) at origin at origin outside France in France
Full Sample
Eq. 2.2 Outcome of interest
Intention to leave 0.605∗∗∗ 1.193∗∗∗ 0.180 1.458∗∗∗ 1.158∗∗∗ -0.171 -1.028∗∗∗ -0.754∗∗∗
(0.198) (0.184) (0.352) (0.106) (0.121) (0.179) (0.179) (0.144)
Eq. 2.1 Intention to leave
Exclusion restriction
Opinion about 0.196∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗
Discrimination (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.035) (0.032)
Burial intention 0.577∗∗∗ 0.567∗∗∗ 0.582∗∗∗
outside France (0.048) (0.054) (0.048)
Observations 9168 9168 9168 9168 9168 9168 7080 9168
Note: In all specifications, we control for gender, marital status, age, age at arrival, educational attainment (5 categories), urban status, employment status, region
of origin (6 regions), region of residence in France (28 regions), socio-professional category (5 categories), presence of a child abroad and presence of a parent
(mother and/or father) abroad. Additionally, we control for proficiency in French upon arrival in column (7). We lose 2088 observations in this specification for
the full sample as we drop migrants from the French Overseas Territories and all migrants who were perfectly proficient in French upon arrival. Standard errors
are clustered at the country of origin level.
Table A7: Bi-probit: Plan to leave vs. Intention
Origin country outcomes Host country outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Outcome of Remit Project Owning Participation Interest in Interest in Improve Own house
interest at origin a house in elections politics politics French in France
(equation 2) at origin at origin outside France in France
Full Sample
Eq. 2.2 Outcome of interest
Intention to leave -0.461 1.399∗ 0.842 1.093∗ -1.164 -1.532∗∗∗
(0.660) (0.734) (1.136) (0.656) (0.772) (0.243)
Eq. 2.1 Intention to leave
Exclusion restriction
Opinion about 0.119 0.149∗∗ 0.130∗
Discrimination (0.075) (0.070) (0.075)
Burial intention 0.265∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗ 0.383∗∗∗
outside France (0.096) (0.127) (0.074)
Observations 3720 3720 3720 3720 2682 3720
Note: In all specifications, we control for gender, marital status, age, age at arrival, educational attainment (5 categories), urban status, employment status, region
of origin (6 regions), region of residence in France (28 regions), socio-professional category (5 categories), presence of a child abroad and presence of a parent (mother
and/or father) abroad. Additionally, we control for proficiency in French upon arrival in column (7). We drop migrants from the French Overseas Territories and
all migrants who were perfectly proficient in French upon arrival in this specification. Standard errors are clustered at the country of origin level.
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Table A8: Bi-probit: remigration definitions
Origin country outcomes Host country outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Outcome of Remit Project Owning Particip. Interest Interest Improve Own house
interest at origin a house in elections in politics in politics French in France
(equation 2) at origin at origin outside Fr. in Fr.
Return vs. rest
Eq. 2.2 Outcome of interest
Intention to leave 0.195 0.349 0.281 1.887∗∗∗ 0.869∗∗ -0.261 -0.830∗∗∗ -0.705∗∗∗
(0.353) (0.326) (0.581) (0.294) (0.348) (0.169) (0.247) (0.123)
Eq. 2.1 Intention to leave
Exclusion restriction
Op. discrim. 0.167∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.051) (0.049) (0.044) (0.049)
Burial intention 0.894∗∗∗ 0.746∗∗∗ 0.755∗∗∗
(0.075) (0.066) (0.061)
Observations 8812 8812 8812 8812 8812 8812 7508 8812
Return vs. stay in France
Eq. 2.2 Outcome of interest
Intention to leave 0.334 0.639∗∗ 0.299 1.897∗∗∗ 0.883∗∗∗ -0.306∗∗ -0.412 -0.743∗∗∗
(0.344) (0.314) (0.462) (0.242) (0.295) (0.154) (0.301) (0.120)
Eq. 2.1 Intention to leave
Exclusion restriction
Op. discrim. 0.204∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.055) (0.056) (0.048) (0.053)
Burial intention 1.060∗∗∗ 1.068∗∗∗ 1.066∗∗∗
(0.088) (0.099) (0.087)
Observations 6005 6005 6005 6005 6005 6005 5146 6005
Leave vs. stay in France
Eq. 2.2 Outcome of interest
Intention to leave 0.312 0.668∗∗∗ 0.253 1.668∗∗∗ 0.991∗∗∗ -0.281∗ -0.565∗ -0.744∗∗∗
(0.234) (0.232) (0.356) (0.161) (0.207) (0.165) (0.308) (0.115)
Eq. 2.1 Intention to leave
Exclusion restriction
Op. discrim. 0.293∗∗∗ 0.294∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗ 0.270∗∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.053) (0.054) (0.050) (0.050)
Burial intention 0.894∗∗∗ 0.989∗∗∗ 0.988∗∗∗
(0.076) (0.095) (0.084)
Observations 6361 6361 6361 6361 6361 6361 5430 6361
Note: In all specifications, we control for gender, marital status, age, age at arrival, educational attainment (5 categories), urban status, employment status, region
of origin (6 regions), region of residence in France (28 regions), socio-professional category (5 categories), presence of a child abroad and presence of a parent (mother
and/or father) abroad. Additionally, we control for proficiency in French upon arrival in column (7). We drop migrants from the French Overseas Territories and
all migrants who were perfectly proficient in French upon arrival in this specification. Standard errors are clustered at the country of origin level.
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Table A9: Bi-probit: Sub-sample with income
Origin country outcomes Host country outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Outcome of Remit Project Owning Participation Interest in Interest in Improve Own house
interest at origin a house in elections politics politics French in France
(equation 2) at origin at origin outside France in France
Full Sample (baseline)
Eq. 2.2 Outcome of interest
Intention to leave 0.156 0.452∗ 0.209 1.697∗∗∗ 0.983∗∗∗ -0.126 -0.898∗∗∗ -0.704∗∗∗
(0.322) (0.248) (0.514) (0.192) (0.209) (0.183) (0.218) (0.164)
Eq. 2.1 Intention to leave
Exclusion restriction
Opinion about 0.260∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗ 0.264∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗ 0.273∗∗∗
Discrimination (0.051) (0.050) (0.052) (0.047) (0.048)
Burial intention 0.740∗∗∗ 0.728∗∗∗ 0.744∗∗∗
Outside France (0.061) (0.077) (0.059)
Observations 8392 8392 8392 8392 8392 8392 6485 8392
Note: In all specifications, we control for gender, marital status, age, age at arrival, educational attainment (5 categories), urban status, employment status, region
of origin (6 regions), region of residence in France (28 regions), socio-professional category (5 categories), presence of a child abroad and presence of a parent (mother
and/or father) abroad. Additionally, we control for proficiency in French upon arrival in column (7). We drop migrants from the French Overseas Territories and all
migrants who were perfectly proficient in French upon arrival in this specification. In all specifications, we control in addition for income using categorial variables
per income range. Standard errors are clustered at the country of origin level.
Table A10: Bi-probit: excluding individuals aged 16 or less at arrival
Origin country outcomes Host country outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Outcome of Remit Project Owning Participation Interest in Interest in Improve Own house
interest at origin a house in elections politics politics French in France
(equation 2) at origin at origin outside France in France
Full Sample
Eq. 2.2 Outcome of interest
Intention to leave 0.332 0.610∗∗ 0.219 1.451∗∗∗ 0.963∗∗∗ -0.407∗∗ -0.797∗∗∗ -0.922∗∗∗
(0.306) (0.277) (0.611) (0.236) (0.247) (0.175) (0.275) (0.125)
Eq. 2.1 Intention to leave
Exclusion restriction
Opinion about 0.287∗∗∗ 0.287∗∗∗ 0.287∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗
Discrimination (0.043) (0.042) (0.044) (0.046) (0.040)
Burial intention 0.780∗∗∗ 0.787∗∗∗ 0.786∗∗∗
Outside France (0.070) (0.096) (0.066)
Observations 6365 6365 6365 6365 6365 6365 4752 6365
Note: In all specifications, we control for gender, marital status, age, age at arrival, educational attainment (5 categories), urban status, employment status, region
of origin (6 regions), region of residence in France (28 regions), socio-professional category (5 categories), presence of a child abroad and presence of a parent (mother
and/or father) abroad. Additionally, we control for proficiency in French upon arrival in column (7). We drop migrants from the French Overseas Territories and
all migrants who were perfectly proficient in French upon arrival in this specification. Standard errors are clustered at the country of origin level.
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Table A11: Bi-probit: Sample composition (exclude current students)
Origin country outcomes Host country outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Outcome of Remit Project Owning Participation Interest in Interest in Improve Own house
interest at origin a house in elections politics politics French in France
(equation 2) at origin at origin outside France in France
Full Sample
Eq. 2.2 Outcome of interest
Intention to leave 0.222 0.626∗∗∗ 0.381 1.644∗∗∗ 1.074∗∗∗ -0.214 -0.908∗∗∗ -0.717∗∗∗
(0.256) (0.217) (0.451) (0.203) (0.204) (0.184) (0.225) (0.143)
Eq. 2.1 Intention to leave
Exclusion restriction
Op. discrim. 0.251∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗ 0.264∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.050) (0.051) (0.046) (0.046)
Burial intention 0.744∗∗∗ 0.732∗∗∗ 0.750∗∗∗
Outside France (0.064) (0.084) (0.062)
Observations 8847 8847 8847 8847 8847 8847 6865 8847
Note: In all specifications, we control for gender, marital status, age, age at arrival, educational attainment (5 categories), urban status, employment status, region
of origin (6 regions), region of residence in France (28 regions), socio-professional category (5 categories), presence of a child abroad and presence of a parent (mother
and/or father) abroad. Additionally, we control for proficiency in French upon arrival in column (7). We drop migrants from the French Overseas Territories and
all migrants who were perfectly proficient in French upon arrival in this specification. Standard errors are clustered at the country of origin level.
Table A12: Bi-probit: excluding individuals born in DOM
Origin country outcomes Host country outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Outcome of Remit Project Owning Participation Interest in Interest in Improve Own house
interest at origin a house in elections politics politics French in France
(equation 2) at origin at origin outside France in France
Full Sample
Eq. 2.2 Outcome of interest
Intention to leave 0.268 0.424 0.177 1.673∗∗∗ 1.094∗∗∗ -0.317 -0.934∗∗∗ -0.733∗∗∗
(0.279) (0.271) (0.532) (0.202) (0.200) (0.203) (0.203) (0.150)
Eq. 2.1 Intention to leave
Exclusion restriction
Opinion about 0.259∗∗∗ 0.259∗∗∗ 0.260∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗
Discrimination (0.053) (0.055) (0.053) (0.048) (0.049)
Burial intention 0.706∗∗∗ 0.726∗∗∗ 0.715∗∗∗
Outside France (0.070) (0.083) (0.068)
Observations 8456 8456 8456 8456 8456 8456 7080 8456
Note: In all specifications, we control for gender, marital status, age, age at arrival, educational attainment (5 categories), urban status, employment status, region
of origin (6 regions), region of residence in France (28 regions), socio-professional category (5 categories), presence of a child abroad and presence of a parent (mother
and/or father) abroad. Additionally, we control for proficiency in French upon arrival in column (7). Besides migrants from the French Overseas Territories, we
drop migrants all migrants who were perfectly proficient in French upon arrival in this specification. Standard errors are clustered at the country of origin level.
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Table A13: Bi-probit: Double instrument
Origin country outcomes Host country outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Outcome of Remit Project Owning Participation Interest in Interest in Improve Own house
interest at origin a house in elections politics politics French in France
(equation 2) at origin at origin outside France in France
Full Sample (baseline)
Eq. 2.2 Outcome of interest
Intention to leave 0.091 0.384∗ 1.126∗∗∗ 1.626∗∗∗ 1.077∗∗∗ -0.100 -0.904∗∗∗ -0.736∗∗∗
(0.331) (0.231) (0.258) (0.185) (0.151) (0.195) (0.229) (0.162)
Eq. 2.1 Intention to leave
Exclusion restriction
Opinion about 0.250∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗ 0.266∗∗∗
Discrimination (0.047) (0.047) (0.049) (0.041) (0.043)
Burial intention 0.712∗∗∗ 0.699∗∗∗ 0.721∗∗∗
Outside France (0.064) (0.083) (0.062)
Share origin 3.122∗∗∗ 3.118∗∗∗ 3.297∗∗∗ 3.096∗∗∗ 3.174∗∗∗ 2.670∗∗∗ 2.831∗∗∗ 2.620∗∗∗
(0.205) (0.205) (0.235) (0.270) (0.206) (0.210) (0.265) (0.194)
Observations 9168 9168 9168 9168 9168 9168 7080 9168
Note: In all specifications, we control for gender, marital status, age, age at arrival, educational attainment (5 categories), urban status, employment status, region
of origin (6 regions), region of residence in France (28 regions), socio-professional category (5 categories), presence of a child abroad and presence of a parent (mother
and/or father) abroad. Additionally, we control for proficiency in French upon arrival in column (7). We drop migrants from the French Overseas Territories and
all migrants who were perfectly proficient in French upon arrival in this specification. Standard errors are clustered at the country of origin level.
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